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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

.JOE S. YALDEZ,

Appellant, }
(Case No.

vs.

STATE OF UTAH,

I
Respondent,

)

10843

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

OF THE NATURE OF
THE CASE

STATE~IENT

The Appellant, Joe S. Valdez, was convicted of
the crime of assault with a deadly weapon and with
being an habitual criminal in the District Court of
eber County, State of Utah.

"T
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DISPOSITION IN THE LO\VER COURT
A complaint was filed against Joe S. Valdez on
the 19th day of .November, 1966, alleging that he did
commit an assault with a deadly weapon by use of 11
knife 011 Jose Don Valerio. In addition, a complaint
was filed charging that the appellant was an habitual
criminal. Trial was held in the District Court of \V eber
County on the 29th day of December, 1966. After a
jury trial the jury returned the verdict of guilty on the
charge of assault ·with a deadly weapon. The status of
being an habitual criminal was subsequently tried to
the court and the appellant was convicted of being an
habitual criminal and sentenced to the Utah State
Prison in accordance with Section 76-1-18, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant submits that in view of the preju·
dicial error committed at the time of his trial on the
charge of assault with a deadly weapon that his con·
viction on that charge be reversed as well as his status
as being an habitual criminal and a new trial granted.

STATE~IENT

OF FACTS

At approximately 7 :30 a.m. on the morning of
November 19, 1966, l\fiss Shirley 'Vilkerson drove the
defendant, Joe Valdez, to his dental appointment in
downtown Ogden, Utah. Upon arriving early, the two
2

decided to go into Gus's Tavern located in the middle
of the block between \Vall and Lincoln on the north
<de of ~.ith Street. They entered and went all the way
t() the rear of the bar since all the chairs in front were
(1ccu p [ed ( T. 68-86) . Since there were no chairs in
b;1d~ the defendant stood up to the bar while .Miss \Vilkerso11 stood close by. Next to Valdez near the end
()j' tlie bar stood a large Indian ( T. 86).

Oll the same morning the victim, Jose Valerio, was
also iu G-us's Tavern drinking beer. Valerio later testitied that he went to Gus's that morning because he
had been doing a lot of drinking the night before and
felt bad (T. 30). According to Valerio, Valdez walked
t1p to where he, Valerio, was standing at the bar, grabbed him saying, "I am going to kill you," and stabbed
him in the stomach with a knife ('f. 31). \Vhen the
stabbing occurred Valerio stated that there was no one
close to him except Valdez ( T. 33) . However, at trial
Rose Hewitt testified that she was sitting not more than
four or five feet away (T. 42). :Miss Hewitt testified
that from this small distance she didn't hear the defendant say "I am going to kill you." She saw the
<lef endant hit him or punch him in the stomach and then
she left ( T. 42) . She did not see a knife.
A much different account of the fight was given
b~,. both the defendant and Shirley \Vilkerson. According to them Y alerio came up to Valdez and asked for
a beer. Valdez obliged. A few minutes later Valdez
complained to Valerio about keeping his hands and
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arms off of him. Valerio kept on bothering him (T. 63).
Then Valdez pushed Valerio back against a pay telephone. , . . alerio came right back and Valdez then hit
him on the jaw knocking him down (T. 64, 86). As
Valerio fell he bumped against the Indian, who either
grabbed him or pushed hi~ (T. 65). Miss "\Vilkerson
later testified at trial as follows ( T. 86, 87) :
" ... Joe told him to leave him alone, but he still
kept bothering him. So he hit him and
knocked him down.
"Q. Did you see him at the time that Joe hit

him?

"A. Yes, he fell and then this Indian jumped
in, I don't know what he did to him. I seen
him get up and go out the back door.
"Q. Now, you say you saw Joe hit Mr. Valerio!

"A. Yes.
"Q. 'V ould you tell us how Joe hit him and
where he hit him and what happened?

"A. 'V ell, he swung around and hit him with his
right.
"Q. "\Vhere did he hit him?

"A. On the jaw.
"Q. This knocked Mr. Valerio down, is that cor·
rect?

"A. Yes, and then the Indian jumped him.
"Q. Did the Indian hit him?

"A. I don't know if he did or not. I know the
guy got up and left."
4

Although no one in the crowded bar saw the stabbing except the victim himself it was later discovered
that \T alerio had been knifed sometime during the
~cuffle. About five minutes after the incident in question
\' alerio got up and left the crowded bar without saying
a word to anyone. He went home to his sister's, who
took him to the hospital.
At about 8 :45 a.m. on the same morning an Officer
Thomas, \vho was assigned to the patrol division, recei,,ed a call from an unknown source who stated that
there had been a stabbing in Gus's Tavern. Officer
Thomas arrived almost five minutes after another
policeman, Officer Flink, had finished searching the
bar. Flink said he could find no evidence of any stabbing
(T. 45). Thomas then went inside to further check
on possible clues as to what may have occurred. While
inside he searched and questioned Valdez but discovered
nothing. Thomas stated that he saw a large Indian
standing close to Valdez. Thomas also testified that
the bar was full and practically every stool was filled.
He stated that everyone interviewed about the alleged
stabbing denied seeing any fight, including the bar maid
( T. 47, 50). The Officer also checked the floor for blood
but found no traces ( T. 46) .
On November 21, 1966, a signed statement from
Y alerio identifying Valdez as the assailant was obtained. The fallowing day, on November 22, a complaint
was signed and a warrant issued for the arrest of Joe
Yaldez charging him for assault with a deadly weapon.

5

The next day, November 23, shortly after 8 a.m., ~Ir.
Richards, attorney for Valdez, called Officer Brook~
and asked if a warrant for Valdez had been issued.
Cpon finding out there was one, Mr. Richards made
arrangements for Valdez to turn himself in ( T. 50,
56).

The trial began on December 29, 1966, before the
Honorable John F. 'Vahlquist, and eight jurors. The
defendant was convicted for assault with a deadly
weapon and for being an habitual criminal. On January
5. 1967, he was sentenced to be confined in the Utah
State Prison for not less than 15 years (R. 14). It is
from that verdict and sentence that the defendant
prosecutes this appeal.
During the course of the trial numerous errors were
committed, three of which were prejudicial and are re·
lied on by appellant for reversal.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJ·
t:DICIAL ERROR IN NOT LI~IITING THE
.JrRY'S CONSIDERATION OF
OTHER
CRil\IINAL INYOLYE~lENT ADMITTED TO
SHO"T l\IOTIVE ONLY, SINCE 'VITHOUT
seen A CCRATIVE INSTRUCTION THE
JCRY COlJLD INFER THAT THE EYI·

6

UEXCE COULD BE COXSIDERED TO SHO\\'
Tll E (~E~ERAL CRll\IINAL PROPEXSITY
OF TUE APPELLANT.
At trial the prosecution m order to establish a
motive referred several times to a meeting between
t lie defendant and Valerio two years prior to the stabnmg. Both Valdez and Valerio had been drinking
together when Valdez was arrested for drunk driving.
I 11 order to link this incident to the stabbing the state
que..,tioned Valerio on direct (T. 22):
Q. Did the officer arrest him?

A. Yes, he arrested him.
(-J_. Did you have any argument with him at all?

A. No.
(~.

Did you later have an argument?

A. 'Ve ... , he called me on the phone about two
or three times and wanted me to take the blame,you

know.
Q. The blame for what?

A. For driving the car.
(-J_. 'Yhy did he want you to take the blame?

A. He said, "I don't want to go to the pen and if
you want to take the blame," you see.
The state also questioned Valerio's wife concerning
the possible motive and she testified (T. 35):

7

Q. Do you know of any arguments that he

your husband have had?

ar 11 :

A. No, not that I can recall, no. I-le had a ca~
from him and another word from him, because I ar~
swered the phone about a year ago. He wanted to talk
to .Jose and him had been together that year befort
\Vhen they eaught him upon that drunk driving. j
was right by my husband when they were talking .
.My husband had already told me about this, so I didn·'·
want to be nosey, I was listening to them when the!
were talking on the phone, and he said he wanted Jose
to take the blame for the drunk driving, because ht
said, "I can't afford to go back in, because of any more
trouble."

\Yhen the state cross-examined Valdez the follow·
ing questions concerning the same incident were askeci
(T. 75, 76):
Q. This is a man that testified against you in the
Court of the drunk driving case.

Q. This is your friend?
Q. You got real mad at him, didn't you?
Q. Because you "..anted him to take the blame fnr
it?

Q. Do you remember calling him on the phone.

,-ou heard the testimony of his wife here, calling him
and asking him to take the blame for you?
In summation before the jury the prosecutor re·

8

c11foreed and emphasized the importance of the moti,·c
testimony ( T. 103) :
·· ... The motive, if there was a motive here
appeared to he the fact that he felt that this for-'
mer friend of his should have taken the blame
so he wouldn't get his parole revoked, because
of the drunk driving provision, he would be back
to prison. He would ha,·e to serve more time.
This is something he was concerned about. It
made him unhappy.

*

*

*

This man has a record of having been in the
prison. The court has told you that doesn't diseredit his testimony, but certainly you can consider it in believing him or not.
Isn't it interesting that everyone else is at
fa ult except Joe? The other man causes all of
these troubles. He is sitting up in the back seat
of the car but he forgets to remember that here
he is in a place violating his parole, right at the
time, even if he hadn't done this he would have
been violating his parole.
Now he wants you to believe that he isn't the
man that caused· this trouble. No evidentally
( sie) there must have been some ill feeling about
this man when he grabbed him here and said
"I'm going to kill you." This isn't something
that men do just every day."
In an effort to keep the trial judge from unconsciously com·eying misleading information the defense
oh.iected to the following instruction:
"Proof of a motive for an alleged crime is permissible and often is valuable, but never is es9

sential. If after consideration and comparison
of all the evidence, you feel an abiding conriction to a moral certainty that the defendant committed the crime of which he is accused, the
motive for its commission becomes unimportant. Evidence of motive is sometimes of assistance in removing doubt and completing
proof which otherwise might be unsatisfactory.
)loti,-e may be shown by positive evidence ~r
by facts surrounding the act if they support a
reasonable inference. 'Vhen thus proved, motin
becomes a circumstance, but nothing more than
a circumstance, to be considered by you. The
absence of motive is equally a circumstance to be
reckoned with, but on the side of innocence, tending to support the presumption of innocence.
and to be given such weight as you deem proper.''
The above instruction was not uttered in a vacuum.
It must be read in the context of the whole trial. The
testimony as to motive was found in the same portiom
of the record in which references to defendant's credi·
bility and criminal record appeared. The fundamental
error in the instruction is the absence of language liniif·
ing the permissible use of the drunk driving evidencr
to show motive and nothing else. 'Vithout such curatiw
language it is reasonable to conclude that the jury
could and did also use the evidence to show the
appellant's propensity to commit the crime and, therefore, as a basis for an inference that he committed the
crime for which he was on trial. The jury might also
have improperly but reasonably believed such evidenct
would be used to show that the defendant was not to
be believed even though under oath. It is undeniable

10

tlia t the instrudion without any restrictive language

hen coupled with the repititious references to the incident. at trial caused undue emphasis in the minds of
the jurors.
11

The requirement of limiting the purpose of evidence of other crimes was articulated in State v. JV ellurd. ;J Ctah 2d 129, 279 P.2d 914 ( 1955). In that case
tl1c defendant was prosecuted for issuing a fictitious
clicck. The state in an effort to show defendant's intent
t () defraud in cashing the check introduced evidence of
J11other eheck which defendant cashed but which the
l1ank had refused to pay. In receiving the evidence the
trial court properly instructed the jury that it could
011ly be used by them for the purpose of showing intent.
011 appeal the Supreme Court in affirming the conviction used the following language which is apropos
here:
" ... It is settled in this court that the state
may not prove that the defendant committed
other offenses merely to show his propensity for
the commission of crime, because such evidence
is apt to be given undue weight. However, evidence of other crimes is admissible if it tends to
prove that he had the necessary intention for the
crime charged. For evidence admissible for one
purpose is not inadmissible because it fails to
meet the requirements for another purpose, but
the }ury should be instructed not to use it for
the inadmissible purpose. This the court did in
this case and contrary to defendant's argument
such instruction was clear and understandable
by the jury."

11

It is importa11t to point out the distinction betwee 11

eYidence which is admitted because relevant to the Ola.iii
issues in dispute and evidence admitted for a limitei;
purpose. In the present case it "\Vas admitted for tht
latter, to show motive. It had very little relevancy t,.
show intent and no relevancy towards supplying a \in~
in the d1ain of events which constituted or indicated
the commission of the crime charged. Nor is it relevant
to show that this particular defendant is not tellin11
'
the truth.< 1 ) It is inescapable that the only real relevancy although tenuous, goes to show a possible factor
inducing the commission of the crime, nothing else.
The policy against allowing such weak probative eri·
dence was clearly stated in State v. Dickson, infra.
where the court stated:
" ... the very purpose of excluding such eri·
deuce is to prevent the prosecution from smear·
ing an accused by showing a bad reputation and
relying on that for conviction rather than being
required to produce adequate proof of the crimt
in question. It is the sound and salutary policy
of the law to indulge everyone, including con·
victed felons, with the presumption of innocence.
and to require the state to obtain and present
sufficient credible evidence to convince the jury
of the defendant's guilt of the crime charged
bevond a reasonable doubt. If this were not so.
se;ious and perhaps insuperable obstacles to
reformation and rehabilitation would exist for
a man who had once acquired a bad reputation.''
( 1 l Drunk driving is not an offense that may be used to impeac~
the credibility of a witness. State v. Fournier, 193 A. 2c
924 (Vt. 1963).
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111 Stall' v. Dicf..:8un, U Utah ~d 8, 361 P. :ld 41~

\ 1\Hi l i. The defendant was charged for robbery of a

store. Ile appealed from a conviction allegi1w
0
, \1 u errors. The first error related to questioning about
pre,·ious felony Clmvictions. The Supreme Court said
t~1at tlic defendant could properly be questioned about
pn·\·ious felo11y co11victions for the purpose of impeachi11g his nedibility as a witness. However, in that case
the prosecutor pressed beyond such purpose, when after
tlw defendant had admitted to two robbery com·ictions,
:1c fttrther asked whether both of them happened to he
rood markets. The prosecutor based his right to go into
t lw details of those felonies upon the theory that he
":ts tryiBg to show a "modus operandi," to show that
the ace med was following some plan or scheme of which
'it her crimes were a part, or where the crime was committed in some particular way, so as to lead one to think
tlie same crimes were committed by the same person .
..:-\.!though the case was not resolved on this issue the
court stated that it did not approve the admission
of nidence of the modus operandi since no logical
inference could be drawn that the person who committed the one committed the other. The second error
upon which the defendant appealed concerned improper
([itestioning of the defendant as to being involved in
an otf ense where his brother was involved in a felony.
That questioning concerned an incident in Texas, sub..,equent to the alleged robbery in Salt Lake City. The
th~frnclant stated that he had been charged but not
~:·ied for robbery m Texas. This Court in reversing
-'TOl'lTY

h

•
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held that such cross examination of defendant was not
justified fur impeachment purposes or on the modu~
operandi theory. Although that case is factually distinguishable from our case the same policy exists here.
In our case as in Dickson, no requirement of similarity
peculiar to the two crimes has been satisfied. The phone
calls to Yalerio do not compel any logical inferenct
that \' aldez stabbed Yalerio. \Vithout any limiting
instruction prohibiting the jury from using the driving
incident as evidence of general criminality it is possible
that an intelligent lay person listening to it at the close
of trial could be misled into using such for resolving
a doubt on the criminal involvement rather than requiring the state to produce adequate proof of tht
crime. Certainly the error here can't be considered
harmless in light of the language used in State v. Dickson, supra:
"Inasmuch as we cannot say with any degree
of assurance that there would not have been a
different result in the absence of the error in
cross examining the defendant about the incident
in Texas, it must be regarded as prejudicial and
the case remanded for a new trial."
Erroneous instructions were held to be reversible
error in Montgomery v. United States, 203 F. 2d 887
(5th Cir. 1953). In that case the defendant was convicted for willfully and knowingly attempting to defeat
and evade income taxes. The Circuit Court reversed
and held that although the district judge could exercise
broad discretion in admitting evidence to show defend·

14

ant\ motive in not reporting his illegal gains or to
t'- ta bl ish

the possible source of the funds used for the
l'\peuditures, he should have cautioned the jury that
.,ul'11 e\·idence was admitted only for the light it might
throw on those specific purposes and no inference of
guilt could be drawn merely from the commission of
11ther offenses different in character.
The same policy was the basis for a reversal in
l'l'oj!ic 'l'. Bentley, 131 Cal. App. 2d 687, 281 P. 2d I
1 J!l,),) i.
In that case the defendant was convicted of
lewd co11d11ct in violation of the state statute. On appeal the District Court of Appeals for California re\ersed primarily for failure of the trial court to give
<'a11tionary instructions as to the limited purposes on the
inquiry of cross examination.
Recently the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia on another but closely related
<1uestion, used language which is apropos here. In
.17...·kard v. United States, 352 F. 2d 641 (D.C. Cir.
I \)()5) , the court held even cautionary instructions might
not protect the interests of the defendant. In that case
the defendant \Vas convicted of simple assault and assault with intent to kill. The prosecuting attorney
cross-examined defendant's character witness concerning defendant's prior arrests. Both witnesses were asked
whether they had heard of defendant's two prior arrests
for assault with a dangerous weapon or her conviction
for disorderly conduct. Since both arrests grew out of
domestic quarrels, upon complaint of defendant's hus-
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band and since the conviction also arose from a domestit
quarrel, the court was not at all impressed with its relevancy. Judge \Vashington in reversing the convictior!
stated:
"The use of such evidence must be closely supervised by the trial judge, not only to assa 1
the prosecuting attorney's good faith but t;J
consider whether the probative value of the information which might be elicited outweighs the
prejudice to the defendant.

" ... Cautionary instructions, copiously pro,·ided by the trial judge in this case, do not gire
the accused adequate protection. They cannot
prevent the jury from considering prior actioru
in deciding whether appellant has committed
the crime charged. The courts need not rest on
the assumption that juries can compartmentalize
their minds and hear things for one purpose and
not for another. The Supreme Court took the
lead in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.
Ct. 1774, 12 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1964), by going
behind the historic assumptions of the law of
evidence and considering the psychological reality of the jury's functioning, in that case as it
related to its consideration of the voluntariness
of confessions."
In light of the above principles, the trial judge in
the instant case was clearly in error for not giving the
jury an instruction allowing them to compartmentalize
the evidence. Although it may be extremely difficult
to frame a limiting instruction so as to give full pro·
tection to the rights of the accused this particular in·
struction falls far short of giving the accused the benefits

16

to ,rliieh he is entitled. In the absence of any similarity
111 1lil' driYiug incident and the crime charged here, such
,,, ide11l'e has no probative value and its only effect

,rnuld be to cast aspersions upon the defendant and
imply that because he was involved in driving trouble
lit· is a person likely to commit a crime or testify falsely .
. \ limiting instruction certainly was required and the
i'ailme to give such an instruction was prejudicial
error.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT CO.Ml\IITTED PREJt 'IHCIAL ERROR IN DENYING DEFEXD.\X'l''S REQUEST THAT THE JURY llE lX~TRUCTED ON THE LESSER INCLUDED
OFFENSE OF ASSAULT AND BATTERY
SIXCE THERE \VAS EVIDENCE IN THE
HECORD TO SUPPORT SUCH AN INSTRL"CTION.
After the Jury had retired the court asked the
defense attorney if he would like to make any matters
of record. l\Ir. Richards raised the following objection
to the instructions when he stated (T. 127):
''The only thing, your IIonor, for the sake of
the record, I would like to let the record show
that I requested the additional instruction to the
jury as a result of l\Ir. Anderson's argument
relative to the assult necessarily connected with
a deadly weapon and not from ·~n assault standpoint separately. I think they might be confused
upon that point."
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Although the request was made, no instruction \la\
given. The court submitted to the jury only two alternatiYe verdicts. The jury could find the defendan'.
guilty or not guilty of assault with a deadly weapon.

It is common knowledge that jury

instruction~

must be responsive to the issues presented. The issue~
in criminal cases are determined by the evidence. Tht
fact that evidence may not impress the judge does not
authoriz.e him to ref use an instruction raised by tbe
e,·idence. However incredible the testimony of the defendant may be, he is entitled to an instruction based
upon the hypothesis that it is entirely true.
\\' e don't deny that if the only evidence presented
m this case was that of the state that an instruction
on the lesser offense of assault and battery would ht
improper since instructions must be grounded upon
the evidence. But this case is different since both sides
presented different versions of the stabbing. The error
in the present case is that the court in its limited in·
structions imposed upon the jury only the prosecution's
theory of the case. Under that instruction Valdez was
either guilty or not guilty of assault with a deadly
weapon. The jury should have been given the other
alternative verdict. If the jury believed Valdez's ver·
sion, it would have been required to bring in a verdict
of simple assault and battery and not assault with a
deadly weapon.
The record contains substantial evidence to support
the instruction on assault and battery. Both on direct
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cross-examination, \'aldez stated that he hit
\ :tlerio 011 the jaw but did uot stab him. Shirley \\'ilh.n-;u11 011 dired examination stated that Yaldez ''swung
:trotiwl and hit him with his right." She testified that
-..11e was standing dose by but saw 110 kuife nor had
a11y reason to belie,·e that Yal<lez knifed \'alerio (T.
t\7 1. Hose Hewitt, who was standing not more tha11
ti1t' fret from the iuei<le11t, stated that she saw \'aldez
l11l or punch Yalerio but saw no knife ( T. 42). Contrary to \' all'rio's version, she did not hear \'aldcz
~ay "l am going to kill you" nor did she see \' aidez
,:.:Tali Yalerio by the coat or shirt as the complai11ant
l1ad JllTYiously testified (T. 42). There was evidence
i11 the reeord which pointed to the Indian at the ernl
"r the har as the possible perpetrator of the stabbing.
\.a ldcz testified on direct that when he hit Yalerio the
i ndian, who was standing at the end of the bar " ...
~.trahbed him, or either grabbed him or pushed him
\\'lieu he fell back against him ... " Shirley "'ilkerson
testified that when Yalerio fell the "Indian jumped
him (T. 87). "'Vhen asked whether the Indian hit
Yalerio she stated: "I don't know if he did or not. I
know the guy got up and left."
:tnd

011

The ahove version of the incident did not go uneontradicted but that is not the measuring rod as to
whether a lesser included offense has been placed in
issue. The Pnited States Supreme Court in Stet•enson
"· l'11itcd States, 162 e.S. 313, (1896), stated at p.

:n4:
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" ... It is difficult to think of a case of killing Ir,
shootiug, where both men were armed, and bur:
in readmess to shoot, and where both did shoo;
in which the question would uot arise, for th·
jury to answer, whether the killing was murder
or manslaughter, or a pure act of self-defenst
The evidence might appear to the court to b:
simply <H"erwhelming to show that the killin~
was in fact murder, and not manslaughter, o~·
au act performed in self-defense and yet, .ir
long as there was some evidence relevant to tht
issue of manslaughter, and credibility and forct
of sut:h e\·idence must be for the jury and cannu
be matter of law for the decision of the court.

The same reason is equally applicable to the factof the present t:ase. Only in the event that Valdez wa~
either guilty of assault v.·ith a deadly weapon or inn11·
eent of that offense could the instruction given by th~
trial court be deemed correct. Such an instructio1
would be correct only if the prosecution's evidence
tended to prove that assault with a deadly weapon had
been committed, and that the defendant had denied
any connection with the alleged offense. But in tht
instant case, the fact of simple assault and battery wai
conceded and the stabbing denied. In such a situation
the court cannot ignore the jury's right to believe that
portion of defendant's testimony which negates the
commission of assault with a deadly weapon, and con·
cedes assault and battery. The issue of simple assault
and battery was squarely posed, and it was prejudicial
error not to instruct thereon.
The eases which have considered the court's duty

20

lesser offenses fall basically into three
;.! !'\ill ps: ( 1 1 The iirst group i11voh·es the extreme "·here
11~ i'L 1s n 1dcm'l' 'd1id1, if aceeptecl by the trier of i'aL t.
1•.1111id ahsolYe defendant from guilt of the greater
, ,ic:1-,c. although it would also support a finding that
,:1 1, :1s guilty of a crime of lesser degree. 111 this situal ;1111 -,ome eo11rts hold that an instruction 011 the lessn
1.il l·11-,c rnust be gin·11 eYen though not requested. and
1i(1 lllaitcr how unlikely it may appear that any yerdiet
.illwr llta!l one of guilty of the higher offense would
111

: 11·

11;sl!'lll'I as tu

rd11rned.

People

1'. ~llorrison,

228 Cal. App. :!d

711:-. :rn Cal. Hptr. 87 4 ( HW4); Smith v. State, 8:3 Oki.

l d :!11!1. 1'i.> P. :!cl :348 ( 1940) ; State

Littlcjoh n.
:).i11 ~l(I. 10.32, 204 S. \V. 2d 750 ( l!H7); State 1•. Fouts,
I 1i:I l~an. li8(i, 221 P. 2d 841 ( 1950); State 1'. Kicks,
~ii :\' .l'. 1.)(), 84 S.E. 2d 545 ( 1954) ; People v. Car1'1111. :w Cal. 2d 7u8, 228 P. 2d 281
( 1951); People
1·.

Cal. 2d 071, 388 P. 2d 355 (19o4); (2)
I 11 the second group of cases the extreme opposite is
fourtd "here the eYidence, even though construed most
!'arnrably to defendant would not support a finding
of guilt of the lesser offense or degree, although the
,.,·idrnee would, if construed by the trier of fact in fayor
111' the prosecution, support a finding of guilt of the
l11gher offense. This situation is generally found in
l'a-;es wht'r<: the defendant denied any complicity in
!lie crime charged, and thus lays no foundation for
a11~· HTcliet intermediate between "not guilty" and
·~·11ilt>·". This situation is also found where the clefrncla11! req11ests 110 instruction and there is no eYidence
.. .Jeter, HO
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in the record to raise the issue as to the lesser chargt.
State v. Jlitchell, supra; State v. Pou/,son, supra; Stat 1
'!J. Dodge, supra. (3) The third situation involves thi)
case and is intermediate between the two just discussed.
Here the evidence is sufficient to support a finding
of guilty of the greater offense based upon the state~
version, and it is also sufficient to support a finding of
guilty of the lesser offense based on appellant's version.
since appellant admitted the assault and battery but
denied the stabbing. Thus, since there was both a request for an instruction as to the lesser offense and
evidence in the record to support the request, it wa~
error for the trial court not to give an instruction 01.
the lesser offense.

State v. Barkas, 91 Utah 574, 65 P. 2d ll30.
( 1937) , is almost identical to the present case and
should be deemed controlling here. In that case the
defendant, a sheep rancher, was charged and convicted
of assault with a deadly weapon for shooting a former
employee in the leg. Defendant claimed he shot the
complainant in the leg to keep him from stealing sheep.
The state's evidence was that the defendant shot the
complainant in Hie leg during an argument over a debt
defendant owed complainant. Defendant requested the
instruction as to the lesser offense, but the trial court
denied the request and took the position that since the
defendant admitted shooting the complainant inten·
tionally to prevent him from stealing he could not ask
the jury to disbelieve his own testimony by allowing
him an instruction inconsistent with his own theory of
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tlw L"ase but must rely on the defense that he was justilicd in shooting him.

The court on appeal reversed
:ind held the jury could pass upon complainant's story
a:- well as defendant's and believe either, neither, or
parts of both. The court at p. 579 lac. cit. addressed
itsdf tu the question whether the trial court should
haw instruded the jury as to lesser or included offmses since such instruction was requested. The court
stated it was error for the trial court to submit the
('at1sc to the jury on only two possible verdicts, guilty
not guilty of assault with a deadly weapon. The
nnirt in criticizing the theory on which the trial court
r<'fused to instruct, stated as follows:
(1r

..... This theory, however, clashes with two fundamental rules, in trial of criminal cases: It has
the effect of the court weighing the evidence
and, in effect, limiting the jury to a consideration
of only part of the evidence (the defendant's) ;
and it, in effect, bases upon the defendant the
burden of proving his innocence or justification.
'i\T e recognize the rule that where defendant
admits the facts substantially as contended by
the State, and justifies his act, he has the burden
of showing the facts to establish his justification.
But in the instant case, defendant did not admit
the State's account of what had happened at the
."I hooting; but denied it in toto, and told an entirely different story of what had occurred and
hml.' it happened. He put directly in issue all
the evidence of the State and the dut.lJ of weighiny one story against the other, belonged to the
}zff/J and not the court. And if the jury believed
Cordovo's stor.11 of how the shooting occurred,
thc.11 might well find a verdict on a lesser charge.
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" * * * the court1S, we think, without excepti(J 11

lw_n' held that, •v.:hcrc th.e accused is charyed
'lA,'tih a yreatcr off ensc, he zs nevertheless entitled
to an in.-,truction that the jury may convict hin,
uf a lc1S1Scr uff cnse if included within the greater
that is, he may he found guilty of simple assuit.
or assault and battery, unless the evidence is ui
such character as will necessarily require a find.
ing that the greater offense was committed b,
him.* * * It is, however, always a delicate matte.r
for a trial court to withhold from the jury tht
right to find the accused guilty of a lesser ur
included offense and determine the question of
the statet of the evidence as a matter of law. That
should be done only in very clear cases."
As mentioned, the present case is unlike State:.
,:l/itchell, 3 etah 2d 70, 278 P. 2d 618 (19jj 1.
In that case the defendant was convicted of sec·
ond degree murder. The evidence at trial showed
that the defendant had possession of a .25 calibre
pistol and was seen to he holding the pistol at the
head of the hotel staircase just after the murder.
'Yhen the defendant was apprehended two days later
human blood was found on his hands and five matching
.25 calibre cartridges were found in his suitcase. De·
fendant appealed to this court alleging that it was error
for the court not to instruct as to the lesser included
offenses. The court refused to reverse the conviction
primarily for two reasons. First, it was not persuaded
that there was any evidence from which reasonable
persons could conclude the victim had died from a
simple battery, or otherwise than with malice afore·
thought or as a result of a murderous intent. Second.
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awl most important the court felt that since the defru<lant failed to request the instruction, "it would
~t·cm pa I pa bly unreasonable" to allow him to sit by
"1th positive assurance of another trial if his client was
l'' 111,ided. It is important to note that the court limited
its holding as follows:
"\Ve confine our holding to the particular
situation where instructions are not requested
and not given."
The present case is quite different since defendant
did request the instruction and there certainly is evidence in the record to reduce the offense to a lesser
degree. Appellant put the lesser offense in issue when
he denied the stabbing and presented his own version
(lf what happened.

State v. Poulson, 14 Utah 2d 213, 381 P. 2d 93
1196:3), is also different than the present case. In that
ease the defendant was tried upon a charge of murder
committed in perpetuation of rape or burglary. In
Poulson, the defendant did not deny murdering the
girl. His sold defense was that of not guilty by reason
of insanity. On appeal defendant alleged error contmding the jury was not properly instructed on the
lessor included offenses. Defendant contended that his
mental condition was such that he could not entertain
the specific intent to commit the crime charged. The
Supreme Court refused to reverse and held that defendant's position could not be maintained since he
did not request any instructions on lesser included
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offenses, and smce it was apparent from the recuri.
that he chose to submit the case to the jury on an "a:
or nothing basis." Our case is easily distinguishablt
Ile re the defendant not only requested the instructi 011
but he also denied committing the crime and presentei.
his own version of what happened. That is entire]1
different than the Poul.son case.
The present case is also unlike State v. Dody 1
Utah 2d ____ , ____ P. 2d ( 1967), where the defenda11:
was convicted of perjury in the first degree. Defendai::
appealed on the ground that the trial judge gaYe 111
instruction as to the lesser included offense of secon 1:
degree perjury. The court refused to reverse for tht
reason that the defendant did not request any sucl
instruction. The court went even further and statei:
that if a request had been made an instruction wouli
have been improper since the evidence was such tha
defendant was guilty of first degree perjury, or he
was not guilty of any crime. The court cited and relied
on the following excerpt from State v. Ferguson, 7i
lJtah 263, 279 P. 55 (1929), where this court statt<l
at 266:
"It is a well settled rule that instruction as tc,
lower grades of the offense charged should bf
given when warranted by th~ ~vidence. It. Ii
equally well settled that in a cr1mmal .P~osecut10r
error cannot be predicated on the om1ss10n of tht
trial court to instruct as to lesser grades of the
. no ev1'd ence Ii·1
offenses charged w l1ere t h ere is
reduce the offense to a lesser grade." State T
Angle, et al., 61 Utah 432, 215 P. 531.
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In ruuny v. United States, 309 F. 2d 662 (D.C.
Cir. l!Hi:!), the court had before it an assignment that
tile trial court erred in failing to give a requested charge

lesser included offense of simple assault where
the defendant was charged with assault with intent to
rnmmit robbery. In reversing, the court used the fol](lwmg language which is also applicable to the present
011

t lie

(':!St':

'· . . . However, implausible, unreliable or
incredible only the jury has the right to make the
evaluation of 'Vest's testimony. The evidence
of a simple assault cannot be regarded as strong
or convincing and perhaps the source could well
be regarded as of dubious reliability, but the
(1uestion of its weight and credibility was for the
jury. On 'Vest's testimony it was possible, even
if not necessarily plausible, that 'Vest was
searching the pockets for weapons not money
or other valuables. The evidence was sufficient
to warrant a jury to infer that 'Vest's intent
was to rob and this intent could be to appellant
as an aider and abettor; but it was also sufficient
to allow for another permissible verdict, i.e.,
that appellant was simply assaulting Collins
while "rest searched for weapons. Even when
instructed on the lesser included offense of simple
assult it would be permissible for the jury to
totallv disbelieve 'Vest or to believe that part
whicl; tended to exculpate appellant from an
intent to rob. The jury might reasonably conclude that 'Vest, by giving his testimony, was
trying to do a favor for his friend Young and
therefore, might reject his explanation as to
the object of the search of Collins. But without
the critical instruction they would not be afford-

27

ed the choice which was exclusively a jury choi~t
The ruliug denying the lesser included ott'e 111 ,
inslrudiou necessarily involved an apprai~al 11 ;
that evidence and \Vest's credibility by the Di~
trid .Judge but the trier cam1ot withdraw that
appraisal from the jury." Kinard v. Cniteti
States, ti8 App. D.C. 250, 9ti F. 2d 522 ( 1938 1.
See also Stevenson v. United States, 162 l'.S
~H3, 323, 16 S. Ct. 839, ~o L. Ed 980 (1890,1.

lu Kinard v. United States, supra, and Steven11u 11
v. LT nitcd States, supra, cited by the court in Y u11111 1
v. C nited Slat cs, supra, it is interesting to note that
both eases were reversed for failure to instruct on tht
lesser included offense of manslaughter in a trial for
murder. A reading of those cases will emphasize tht
necessity of submitting the issue for the determinatioi,
of the triers of fact. See also United States v. Jlou1-,.
Hi

CSC~IA

375, 36 C~IR 531 (1966).

In Brough man v. United States, 361 Fed. :2d il
(D.C. Cir. 196{)), the defendant was convicted of robbery in the lower court. He appealed seeking reversa'.
of his robbery conviction on the ground that the trial
judge erred in refusing to instruct the jury on tht
lesser included offeme of simple assault. In that cast
the (;.overnment's e\·idence consisted of the complaini11~
witness testifying as to being robbed and struck in tht
face by appellant while appellant's co-defendant wa,
holding him. The co-defendant denied the charge and
testified that the appellant "·as merely trying to sep:irate the plaintiff from a screaming woman and tha!
appellant never struck the plaintiff, but merely pulled
28

at him. The iudictmeut alleged a taking by force and

olern:e. The court held that an instruction on the
ks~cr included offense of simple assault should be req u1red si11cc there was evidence of the lesser crime. The
goYernment argued that the co-defendant's testimony
~liowcd a justifiable assault and that plaintiff's testimo11y showed a robbery. Therefore, the government
L'!>11tended the jury would have to believe all or nothing
oi' either the co-defendant's or the plaintiff's testimony.
1'11e eourt disagreed and reversed, relying primarily on
l'uun.<J '1'. Cnitcd States, supra. The court made the fol111\1 i11g statemeut which is certainly apropos in the
present case:
11

"The fact that Blake's testimony raised an
issue whether appellant was guilty of any crime
at all is not inconsistent with appellant's claim
that this same testimony raised an issue whether
a lesser included offense had been committed.
Here the jury could have believed Blake's testimony that he and appellant did not rob \Veedon while at the same time finding, in light of
the injuries sustained by \Veedon and the fact
that appellant was found with bloody clothes
and skinned knuckles, that they had assaulted
him. \Yhether the assault was justified was a
question for the jury."
The same analysis should apply here since the jury
· could have believed" Yaldez's testimony that he did
not stab Yalerio while at the same time finding, in light
of the story told by Shirley \Vilkerson, that Valdez
as~aulted Yalerio without any knife.
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Appellant is not unmindful of the decisions whici,
hold that in certain cases where the evidence is all 01 1'
sided and shows a willful, malignant, and maliciou,
killing, au instruction 011 the lesser included ott'en,,
may not be justified. The same may be true where tlit
defe11da11l fails to request an instruction and d1oo~t·
the "all or none" approach. The case law, howerer
is almost unanimous in recognizing the necessity fo 1
instructing the jury as to an included crime of les~ti
degree when there is evidence from which the jur.1
could find that such lesser crime was committed. Tii,
presence of such evidence is the determinative facti11
111 looking at the re<.'ord there is ample evidence in tl111
<.'ase. \ 'aldez was not silent as to what occurred in Gu~,
'Ln·ern. Xo knife was found. Appellant's testimon:,
alone or even Shirley \Vilkerson's alone is enough\,
require an instruction on simple assault and battery
Appellant did not admit the state's account of wha;
happened, but denied it in the most important asper!
and gave his own account of what occurred. It wa'
reversible error not to let the jury pass upon that
n,rsion as well as the state's and believe either, neither
or parts of both.

POINT III
AFTER EYIDEXCE OF THE DEFEXD·
AXT'S PRIOR COXYICTIONS HAD BEE~
..:\D)IlTTED FOR TIIE PURPOSE OF DI·
PE..:\CH)IEXT. IT
AS PREJUDICIAL

"r
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EHHOH FOH THE TRIAL COCRT TO GIYE

I:\STHl 'CTIOX XC)IBER 10 \YITIIOCT AX
I\ STHl 'CTI OX LI:\IITING THE PCllPOSE

\\'IIICH THE E\TIDENCE HAD BEEX
.\U-'ll'l'TED.
l-'()H

The trial court erred in denying the defendant's
re<lue:-,t for a more limiting instruction and sending to
l l1l' J lll'Y instruction number 10 which reads as follows:
"The fact that a witness had been convicted
uf a felony if such a fact, may be considered by
you in judging the credibility of that witness.
The fact of such a conviction does not necessarily destroy or impair the witness' credibility
and it does not raise a presumption that the witness has testified falsely. It is simply one of the
circumstances that you are to take into consideration in weighing the testimony of such a
witness."
Because of the prejudicial and repetitious questioning of Y aldez by the prosecutor, Mr. Roland Ander-.;on, )lr. Richards took exceptions to the above
instruction contending it would place undue emphasis
1H1 the fact that the defendant had been convicted of
prior crimes ( R. 98). Th exception did not cause the
rnurt to change its instructions to the jury.
The prejudicial effect of letting the jury know
(\f these prior convictions is acknowledged by many.
l ts admissibility is based primarily on the belief the
.i11ry ha-; the ability to segregate the evidence according
to its permissible uses. However, when the court admits
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e\·ide11ee of other corn·ictions for credibility purpo,t,
it should also instruct the jury to limit the considerat 11 ,:
of the evidence to the issue of credibility. The tri:
court failed to limit the instruction in this case. l:
."ilritc 1'. lf'i11yct, t> etah 2d 243, 310 P. 2d 738 ( IH.37
.J uclge \\" ade obsen-ed the possibility of prejudiet ..
admitting evidenee not relevant to the issue of guil·
Ik stated as follows:
·· ... Except where otherwise provided by HuJe,
of E,·idence all relevant evidence is ad1;1issihlt
Relevant e\·idence means evidence having a tti1deney in reason to prove or disprove any material facts in issue. However, evidence that·'
person committed a crime on one occasion is ir,admissible to prm·e his disposition, bad character.
or propensity to commit crime as the basis f,.r
an inferenee that he committed the crime frr
whieh he is on trial, but such evidence whe:
re}e,·ant is admissible to prove some materi:i;
facts including the absence of mistake or acciden'
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan.
knowledge or identity. The reason for excludin~
such evidence is that the danger of prejudice out·
weighs the probative value of such evidence."
It is not denied that the defendant's attorney cl!i
opening arguments first brought out the fact that tht
defendant had been c01wicted on prior occasions. I'.
doing so. :\Ir. Richards knew he was not opening an:
door that wouldn "t he opened anyway since the de·
fe11dant Yaldez would e\·entually have to take the stanc
to defend himself. But just because l\1r. Yalclez t0t 1 ~
the staml to protect himself. that doesn't mean he should
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lw denied those limitations on eYidence referred to by
.I us tire \\' ade. The defendant had no real choice in the
lll:tttl'r. Ile had to testify to defend himself. It should
lit pointed out, however, that the prosecutor, before
the def e11dan t took the stand, illicited eYidence pert;1i11 i11µ; to the defendant's prior convictions. )Ir. Andt"l'SlJll obtained information from Valerio on direct
t'\.:tmi11a ti on concerning the possibility that Valdez
11111 dd be baek in the "pen" if Valerio wouldn't take the
idamc for the drunk driYing charge ( R. 22). Valerio's
11 ifr when questioned on direct examination also ment i111wd that Valdez called Valerio and stated that she
Iii ard the defendant say, "I can't afford to go back
111 lieeause of any more trouble."
In an effort to impeach the defendant, the prosel'll tor asked Valdez on cross-examination the following
r<'petitious and prejudicial questions concerning prior
rnmes including his parole violations:
(~.

'Yhy did you go to the tavern (R. 73) !

(~.

Do you know that is a violation of your parole?

Q. You didn't care about that, did you?

Q. You knew you could go back to prison for that,

didn't you 1
(~.

That didn't stop you from going there?

(~.

You knew it was a violation didn't you?

Q. You also knew if you didn't get caught you

11011ld1i't go hack to the penitentiary, didn't you?
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Q. Now, you state that you have been m pri~(, 1
is that right?
Q. l\lore than once?

Q. 'Vhat were you in prison for?
Q. 'Vasn't it, in fact, you were charged with
bery (R. 74)?
it?

r(i'

Q. In fact, it was assault and robbery, too, wa,; 1

Q. I am talking about this time of release. w:!·
it in l\lay? 'Vhat was the charge for which you recein-,
sentence?

Q. The original offense was assault and robhm
isn't that the truth?
Q. You had been m prison before that too!

Q. You had been in prison on another offense'
Q. You had been in prison on other offenses bt·
fore this?
Q. Now, of course, you know that assaulting some·
body is a violation of your parole too, isn't it (R. 80

Q. And also carrying a knife would be a violatim
too, wouldn't it?
Q. And, also going into the tavern is a violatior.
too, isn't it?
Q. And drinking is a violation too, isn't it?
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(~. And. keeping company with people that are

11 , 11

.i ust

right is also a violation, too, isn't it!

There is a lot of things that is a violation, isn't
:hat righU
(~.

(~.

Y m1 pay attention to those that you want to

pay attention to, isn't that right?

You pay attention to those that are violations
tl1at you want to, and those that you don't want to, you
dC1ti't pay any attention to?
(~.

(~.

Let me make it clear to you.

You don't mind going to the tavern enough
:n{iugh you know that is a violation, you don't mind that,
d11 ~·ou ( R. 81) ?
(~.

You have been in the tavern many times during
the time you have been on parole, haven't you, Joe?
(~.

You have been in fights too, while you have
ht·c11 on parole, too haven't you, Joe?
(~.

The prosecutor again mentioned the defendant's prior
eonvictions in his closing argument to the jury. He
~t:tted (R.104):
"Joe isn't what you would say is an inexperienced man. Joe has had experience with the law
before. Joe is a smart man, by the way. His
testimonv from the witness stand indicates that
this mar{ is a thinker. If he were to-here is a
man that obviously has already violated his parole
regulations. He is going to places he should not,
he is drinking, he is possibly associating with
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people he shouldn't he associating with under 1
parok arrangement."
It is11 't denied that when the defendant does ta,
the sta11d the prosel'ution may as a rule impeach Ii:
by i11trodll<:i11g his past reeord. IIowever, the pr 11v
eutor's refen·nl'es to the defendant's violation of par.
hy going i11 a har or having a drink have no reasonai,,
relationship to veral'ity as against the likelihood
pre.)udil'ing the jury. The whole line of questio11i1..
allowed under the guise of impeaclunent was certami.
11ot .. rele,· all t ev i<lence lun·ing a tendency in rea.11 1'.
t<i pru,·e or disprove any material facts in issut
. . \!though this appeal is not based on the ground tl1.
the questions propounded were necessarily re,·ersii1,
error. we do elaim that those questions without a11\
elem· instructions limiting the only purpose for wh)c
that tcstimouy could be used might be enough to int.:
guilt and l'onvict an innocent man.
The need to limit the purpose for which impead
mellt e,·idence is introduced was indicated in Stat.
z·. Edr1.:rIJ"dR. 13 Ctah 2d 51, 368 P. 2d 464 (19621. l'.
that case the defendant was convicted of profiting fM!.
the earnings of a fallen woman. On cross-examinati1'
the defendant was asked prejudicial questions concerr
ing his pre,·iously being in jail and his tendency fr·
getting drunk in public. On appeal this court reHN
on the ground that the "defendant in a criminal ca~·
may not be questioned as to matters wholly rem1r
from the questions of guilt or innocent of the criru
charged. so as to amount to a general assault upon 1'"
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diarader". This court also expressly referred to the

for limiting instructions, but since no instruction
1, a.., rcqueskcl, the court refused to rule on that ground.
llw court stated:

Jlt'('(l

"l 11 the instant case, the defendant having
placed in issue his wife's character, the fact that
..,he had pleaded guilty to the crime of prostitution tended to impeach the defendant's assertion
that his wife was a woman of good character,
and thus impeach his veracity. Therefore, the
ct ucs tions propounded relating to the wife's plea
nf guilty were proper for this limited purpose.
An iwdructiun to the jur.IJ re.ytrictiny its cunsidcration uf thi.Y evidence tu this limited purpose
ccrtainl.t1 7.1..;uuld have been in order. However,
110 such instruction was requested by the defendant."
E ve11 so this court reversed. It is urged that this
{'()lift compare the line of questioning in Edwards with
the questioning here. It is almost identical. Although
1t i~ not contended that the questioning was necessarily
reYersible error, it is called to the court's attention to
~how the greater need for limiting instructions. The
que'itioning here like in Edwards is certainly collateral
and remote to the issue of his guilt or innocence.
This court in State 'L'. Wellard, 3 Utah 2d 129,
:!iU P ~cl Hl4 (1955), again referred to the need for
m-,truetions couched in plain and unambiguous lang-uage. The court at p. 133 stated:
" ... It is settled in this court that the state
may not prove that the defendant committed
other offenses merely to show his propensity for
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the eommiss ion of erime, bee a use sueh eridu 1,.
is apt to he given undue weight. llowe,·1:r. q.
e\·ide11t·e of other crimes is ~ulmissihle if it tt 11 ,;,
to pro,·e that he had the necessary intention!.·
the crime charged. For e\·idcnce admissible f.
one purpose is not inadmissible beeause it fa.!.
to meet the requirements for admissibilitr 111 •
another purpose. but tlu: jur,1; should he in.~i,. 111 •
l'd l/()f to uu it for the inadmissible JJlll'Jlli.1 1
Thi.'< the 1·011rt did in this case and contran1 t
dcfc11da11t's (//'rf ll lllC11t such instruction '1w1.~ i1t•r
and 1111dcrstruulablc by the jury."
Facts in the present case are similar to Kemp:
Gui·cr1111101t of Canal Zone, 167 F. 2d 938 (5th Cir
I U48 1. where the court did give limiting instructio11·
ln the case the defendant was convicted of murdtr
\\'ht>n defendant took the stand on cross-examinati1
he was asked if he had been previously convicted ·
two felonies in the State of \ Vashington and whethe:
they were robbery and murder. The trial court i11stru1'1nl the jur.IJ that those convictions could not be tal.n
a.'< C'l.'idcnce of yuilt or innocence upon the trial. ln1
u:erc to he considered only as affecting defendant
crcdibilit.tJ as a witness. On appeal the court held th1.'
iw.;truction 'li..:as not in error. The court agreed that wk
the defendant took the stand in his own defense he wa,
subject to impeachment like any other witness, bu'.
the court also felt that the defendant deserved thr
proper limiting instructions.
1:

The l'ourt in J/ afters v. Cornmon"ll:ealth, 2-15 S.W
::?ll ~na (Ky. 1 !);)::? ) • also recognized the need to explai·
to the jury the proper use of such testimony. In th3·
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the defe11da11t was charged with and convicted of
t'<•Illlllitti11g armed robbery. The court on appeal re, t·r~ed aud stated that although the questions asked
llit· defendant on cross-examination concerning his prior
,·111:,·iction were admissible, it was the duty of the trial
t'<iurt to admonish the jury as to the limited purpose for
11 hid1 the nidence was admissible.
l·a~t·

The court in Parley r. State, 93 Okla. Cr. 192, 226
Ii. :.!d I 00:.! (I HJ I ) , also recognized the need for limit:! 1).! i11slrnctio11s. In that case the defendant was cou1 ll'kd of grand larceny. The counsel for defendant on
,iirl'd examination in interrogating his own witness
l1rr1t11.d1t out the fact that he had been convicted of
t liree prior felonies for which he has served time. On
nnss-examination the county attorney, like in our case,
\1t·11t into the nature of the crime for which the witness
had been convicted and without objection by defense
l'Otlllsel. The trial court gave the following complainedof instruction:
"In considering the testimony of a witness
who the evidence shows has heretofore been convicted of an offense, you may consider such fact
of convicton onl,ll as it may or may not in your
judgment affect the weight or credibility you
may give to the testimony of such witness."
011 appeal the court agreed that such cross-examination
was proper but added:

"So, where, in the case of a witness for either
the <lefendant or the state, evidence is admitted
and limited to the purpose of affecting the credi-
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bility of such witness, showing prior co11vict.
or e011victions for erime, the State ur the dc1~ ·
ant, w1 the case may /Jc /Jy the same pri1tli·
1
i m.·olrcd 7.1.:h c 11 such n:id e 11 cc 7.L'as ad 111 iIt nl 1•·'.
o dcft'lu/r111t, 7.1.:ould he entitled tu an instr 11 cr 1
l'.'I the trial juyc, limiti11y the purpuu fur ,t'i11

:welt <Tidcncc 7.L'as admitted, a."S uthcn.l·isc .11 .
n·idcncc miyht prejudice the defendant or :1
State as the case might be beyond the scopt;
which the testimony was admitted. For ~u~
reason, we conelwle that the court did uot t·r
in giving the instruction complained of." .
These cases have indiea te<l that the principal pr1.r
km in the w .. e of prior COI!Yidions to impeaeh i~ '.i
risk of the improper use of the evidence by the j11r
partil'ularly where the defendant is being impead1·
111 his capacity as a witness. Empirical evidence by::
l · niversity of Chil'ago Jury project confirms the m,;.
of what has been suspected: "jurors have an 'alm1·
unin.Tsal inability an<l or unwillingness either to undt·
stand or follow the court's instruction on the ust
defendant's prior l'riminal record for impeachmei.
purposes·.· See Xote 70 Yale L. J. 763, 777 ( 1961
In another study. Hans Ziesel and Harry Kah-en, Jr.
both l'niversity of Chicago law professors, haw ju·
completed an exhaustiYe ten-year study of the behari1·
of .iuries in felony trials throughout the countf)
Kah-en -": Ziesel. The American Jury (1966). 'n·
authors first selected a national cross section of :1P
felony eases. all of which tried before juries ht
tween I n.H and I H58. They then obtained detailed wr::
ten interYiews from the judges who presided at e3t:
1

-W

1( tllt'se trials. From each of the judges they ascertained
, 1. the result the judge would have reached had the
l a.,l. bcrn tried before him sitting without a jury, and
·• if tkre was a difference in result, the judge's exiilai1alio11 from the result reached by the jury. Then
1r111n that the authors analyzed the material and drew
: lie t"()!lcillsio11s they felt their analysis permitted. Those
·t111l'iusiu11s which show the definite need for limiting
'! ~t rndo11s as to the use of prior convictions for imI" al·h111('11t are as follows:
The jury is far more likely to acquit a defend.lll: " lio has no record and takes the stand than will
11w .iudge.
l.

111 117 of the 3576 cases, the defense counsel
duist· a jury and the defendant was either convicted
r the jury could not reach a verdict. In each of those
J 17 eases, the judge, had he been sitting alone, would
lian: acquitted. In thirteen percent of these cases, the
u11farnrable verdict was attributable to some immoral
,1r rnlgar behavior on the part of the defendant. The
authors find that a number of these jury verdicts were
,lt1t· to the jury's lack of sophistication in making credibility evaluation. In their view, the judge is better able
Io ft'llcc off the less credible components of the case, and
'>eparate the wheat from the chaff. The jury tends to
f, illt"' the old maxim, f al us in uno, falus in omnibus.
·\" ende11ce of the jury's lesser ability the authors point
t 11 t l1t· fact that in ten percent of these 117 cases, the
1kf 11da11t either failed to testify or had a record.
See
~-

•

1

ti)

1
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also .J o~ma X. Ko1>l0Yit·z, J>oc1k
J>c,·1·,
·
>
'.._·w, (_' r11n.?
Law Bulletin, Xo. U (HHW).
. . ~<'ro~n that ~tudy. one can see the need for p:·1111
l11n1tmg mstruet1011s smce eYidenl'.e of prior co11, iL·t..
is properlv introduced not as eYide11l'.c of guilt IHll i
impeachme11t purposes. It is also important ti 1 11 ,
that if the jury is gi,·e11 the proper cautionary in~tr.
tion they do haYe the ability to understand and fi•i;,
it. Kah-en and z;esel. in their study of 'Phc A 1111 ri .
.Jury, stated as follows:

"l. pon analysis, howe\·er, we read the l°h'.:
as making an importa11t point about tlu.: i:.r.
re,·olt from the law. It has been a h:1sic ·tLt·
of this study that the jury by and large resp11,:
to the discipline of the e\·idence, and whl'n
does not, it L'onceals from itself its own resJ)(I'..
to sentiment, sentime11t under the guise of rl's111
ing issues of eYidential doubt ... Table Ill
,·eals that the discipline of the eYidence and;·
discipline of the judge's comments re-e11f11n
each other with the result that, when both :::
present, they Yirtually eliminate disagrermer ·
The moral then is that the momentum of l!·
jury's ren>lt is neyer enough to carry the .iu'
beyond the e,·idence and the judge." Kalren"
Ziesel. The American .T ury, p. 427 ( 19tHi 1.
1•

It is also important to note that where there i~ ~:
indictment for a felony and also a second count rhar~
ing the alleged felon with being an habitual crimin~
Ftah by statute has adopted the policy of keepr'.
former conYictions from the jury until the guilt or iw.
cence of the accused, under the charge of the prN'.
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1s dt:krmi11ed, lTtah Code Arm.~ 70-1-rn (1953).
l'i 1, \ital ditl'erem·e between this method and the comiJ!"11 i:t\1 11wthod is that under this statute, former co11\ 'l'' 11111' :1n· kept from the jury until the guilt or inno•·. 11 -.· 1-, dder111i11ed, whereas at common law the con,d11111-. are allowed i11 with cautionary i11structio11s
...''t'rt !1• tile jury. l~tah's statute was adopted after a
, Iii l:tr l'll11rn·ctic11t statute. The reason for such pre' .,,111\lt 11a-. me11tio11ed in State i·. Jt'erro11e, !}() Corm,
liitl. l 1:1 .\. -t-.'5:!, 457 (1H21 ). where the court stated:

,r:i 11 c.

.. 1t cannot be belie,·ed that an accused man
would e\·er haYe a fair trial resulting in a verdict
not affected by prejudice or by consideration
by which the jury should not be infiuenced, if
during that trial allegations that he has twice
before been conyicted of state prison crimes have
been read to the jury, and evidence of his former
eonvictions has been placed before them."
The effect of allowing the prosecutor to impeach the
,!tfr11da11t here without limiting the application to
11 li1cli prior convictions can be put by the jury operates
ti· l·11111pletely abrogate the effectiveness of the above
-.Litute ..An argument that the defendant had a choice
1111! \I 1 take the stand is not persuasive since \' aldez
i,;,d 111> real choice in the matter. He had to take the
,(arid to defend himself and avoid any adverse infer' tit'1·~. Since l'tah has seen fit to legislate this policy
pr. 1L1hit ing inferenees of guilt based on prior convic1 1 111-..
it -.hould then he enforced at least by limiting
tih lhf ,if· t·Yidenee of prior convictions by advising the
11JJ"\ of its restricted use. This court in State v.
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Sullit·<rn.

Ii i·tah ~d 110, :w7 P. ~d ~l~ {l!l.>i1. ar:

lated this polil'y in a similar ma1mer:
··The presumption of i1111on·11t and the l'llJ' .
me11t of prollf of g111lt beyond any rca~1'11.
douht, arc indeed of the utmost importa1iL·i
:-.afrguards against the possibility of l'Oll\JL'.
the i1111ol'l'nt. \\'e sn11pulously adhere t11 ;!
11ot withstanding the dill'il'ulties e11l'ou11ltrtd .
the po:-.sibility that so111t· guilty may esl'apl' 11 .
ishment. It is a11 anl'ien t and honored ada,;,
our law that it is hettn that ten gui1~1 •
free than that one in11ol'e11t person be }H1111~
II' c a JJ prccia le I Ii c ,,:isd o 111 of th c 111rui111

the i111porla11u· of ol'Cordiny C7.'tr// propa.
,11idcratio11 lo those accusul uf crime."
The l'ourt in ,')'umrall

l 'nitcd Statc8, 3tW F
:311 (10th Cir. IHtiti), also rel'ognized the llel'e~~1'._,
ha Ying exading instrul'tions. In that ease the dtt1;
ants were l'OllYided after a jury trial of armnl :
hery of a federally insured bank. The only point ra ·
on appeal was that the trial l'<Hirt l'ommitted enw
refusing to strike an "unresponsi,·e, prejudil'ial :1:
inflammatory" referenee by a polil'e offil'er-wit11t''
the past "reeords" of the defendants. The Tenth L ·
euit Court of Appeals. eom·eding that the eYidelll't
guilt was m·erwhdming, neYertheless re\'ersed the L""
Yid ion. It held. citing numerous cases, that eYidr1,
of prior eriminal eornlud was not admissible to e,t::
lish guilt. The eourt stated that whether a reYersal :l'
new trial is required depends on "whether the .1c
was more prone to en11Yid these appellants knowing- frt
t'.

1 prt·\ 1< 1t1 . . records ... The court then made this tiiial
~ ,t n at 1011. "Ii ich is certairdy appropriate here:
1

.

"Tt:dmical niceties sud1 as these make the law
:11'lwar ridiculous to the man in the street. But
;til law is technical if viewed 011h· from eo11eer11
f11r punishing crime without he~ding the mode
11\· \\ hich it is accomplished' ... See J ustiee Frankf;1rtn i11 Bullc11/J('('k 1'. l'.S., a:w lT.s. ti07, tiU,
titi S. Ct. +o~. UO L. Ed. :350. "In cireurnstances
ld-.t· tlwse the question is not whether the appdla11b ha n· been proven guilty, hut whether guilt
11a., IH'cll established aecording to the proeedural
. . a frgua nb to insure trial before a fair and u11prc_p1diced jury. It is not enough to be able to
. . ;1y that the e\·idence is entirely sufficient to
l'(Jll\ ict without reference to prior records of appcll:rnts and that the jury would ha,·e in all
Jirohabilities returned a verdict of guilty with' 'lit such knowledge. The question we must cle('idt· is whether the jury was more prone to con' id these appellants knowing they had pre,·ious
rernrds than without such knowledge. In other
w11rds. can we say without reasoriahle certainty
that the reference to prior records 'had but ,·ery
slight etket 011 the ,·erdict of the jury'?"
need only read the transcript pertaining to
'.l\f' cro...,s-examination of Yaldez to see the need for a
·:1 1t11111ary instrudion. (See R. 7:3, 74, 80, 81). The
:r 1al <'(1t1rt's refusal to give a limiting instruction in
1!.!lit of tht" need for one, the defendant's request for
' 1:1t" :llld the <'ase law requiring one was definitely prejul1t·1:tl and n·versihle error.
( )11e
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COXCLL'SlOX
Thl' 111sta11t action prl'sl'11ted facts to tlit .!·."
whl'rl' thl' pmilio11 of the prosecutor and thl' d1 ".
were sulista11tially at loggl'rheads. The curnµlai1.
wit11l'ss was till' only i11di,·idual whose testi1uo11y ,
ported all the elements of the crime with ,,Ji1ti1
appellant was charged. A large portion of the tllilt
reeein·d at trial was directed towards the appdb;
pn·\'ious criminal reeord and i11Yoln_.ment. 111 tlit
sem·e of i11Strudio11s limiting the use of this te-.,!1111
with the narrow limits which the law recog11iz(·-., , .·
porti11g its i11trodudio11 the appellant was 0111 '" .·
pn·judiecd. Further the failure of the trial c111, ...
instrud 011 the lesser included offense which wa" r:i,
hy the e\·idem·e is blatant prejwlieial error. It i." 11!11
justice will he serYed only by returning this !';N ·
Ill'\\' trial under eireumstanees which will i11s11rt· :.
any ('om· id ion will n·s1rlt therefrom would he tht rr·,1
of proof of guilt of the crime eharged and not lllt!°'
of h:l\·ing a had record in the past.
This eourt should reYerse.
Respectfully submitted,

HOXALD X. BOYCE
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